
Crisis in Conscience at Quasar

by John J. Fendrock



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The increasingly competitive business environment has resulted in a condition in which many managers are being subjected to tests of conscience for which they are ill prepared—indeed, for which there may be no preparation. It has become increasingly difficult for them to act their individual parts well, and still retain free and clear consciences.

The thesis of this article is that modern-day managers are often faced with situations where they are required to commit themselves, either openly or tacitly, to an action they may not agree with. They may be participating, willingly or unwillingly, in activities that are morally and ethically cloudy; questionable from a business point of view; and, perhaps, of doubtful legality.

This case history, based directly on an actual situation, emphasizes the complex and arduous problem of ethics—business and personal—facing managers today. Un-doubtedly, ethical conduct has always been a problem of some proportion, but in today's competitive business environment perhaps it is even more so. The case raises the issue of the correct course of action for managers who are confronted with accepting questionable conduct of their superiors by being expected either to agree to it or to close their eyes to it.

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The subject here is not the case of an act that is patently illegal; or where the responsibility is specific and detailed; or where the facts are clear-cut and defined. Rather, the issue under scrutiny involves unclear, undefined areas of activity where, by association, an individual is involved in a course of action that he *believes*—not necessarily *knows*—is wrong.

Readers are invited to send in their views on this provocative case history, set forth below, which tackles one of the more complex and difficult problems facing managers today.

The Case Setting

Universal Nucleonics Company, the parent company for a number of wholly owned subsidiaries, suddenly found itself in the embarrassing position of having to report that its earnings for the year would be substantially lower than had been announced at the end of the previous quarter. Shortly thereafter, a statement appeared in the "Who's News" section of *The Wall Street Journal* reporting that Quasar Stellar Company, one of Universal's subsidiaries, had a new president and a new vice president of finance (replacing the former controller).

As time went on, the financial community learned that Universal had discovered that one of its subsidiaries had been withholding the truth, pur-

posely distorting the facts, or otherwise misrepresenting the situation at hand in its monthly reports to corporate headquarters. By the time Universal had realized the actual condition of Quasar's financial situation, it was too late to correct it without affecting the reported year-end earnings of the parent company.

The two individuals most directly concerned at Quasar—John Kane, president, and Hugh Kay, controller—had both “resigned.” It was generally agreed by the board of directors that there would be no public announcement as to the reasons for the resignations. Privately, however, one director stated flatly that out-and-out fraud was involved; another, more in tune with the times, said that the situation was directly attributable to the pressures to make good and the tendency to have a positive outlook on the outcome of all individual company problems.

Corporate headquarters was vitally interested in finding out why, given the organizational structure at Quasar, no feedback had been received independently of the president-controller monthly statement; whether any of the other executives were involved in the reports either knowingly or unknowingly, willingly or unwillingly; and, finally, what steps could be taken to prevent a recurrence of the situation in the future.

Fact-finding team

To resolve these questions, Universal's executive committee decided that a direct approach should be taken. The executive vice president and the vice president of industrial relations for the corporation would conduct a series of interviews with the Quasar Stellar personnel who might have been

involved. Both men were well qualified to appraise the situation. Jim Bowden, the executive vice president, was both an operating and a financial man, having spent a number of years in each area. Hubert Clover, vice president of industrial relations, was a former professor of industrial psychology at one of the leading business schools.


It was further agreed that each executive would interview different men, compare notes, and then speak with each other's interviewees if the situation so warranted. After studying the organization chart (see *Exhibit I*), and the company's “Manual of Responsibilities,” they decided it would be best to talk to Peter Loomis, vice president-marketing; George Kessler, vice president-manufacturing; and William Heller, vice president-engineering.

Loomis' Session

The scene opens in a small conference room at Quasar Stellar Company. The first man to be interviewed is Peter Loomis, vice president-marketing, who is known to be outspoken, demanding, and intensely loyal. Loomis is greeted by Hubert Clover.

Clover: Pete, as you know, the purpose of our chat is to see if we can learn something from this unfortunate episode that can help to prevent such an occurrence in the future. I would like to get your version of what has happened and any suggestions you may be able to offer as to what can be done to help our planning.

EXHIBIT I. Organization Chart of Quasar Stellar Company



*Now replaced by new man.

Loomis (defensively): Well, Hubert, you know I thought very highly of John. I'm certain you are aware that he hired me for this job. I don't mind admitting that I think the decision to fire him was unwarranted and ill advised.

Clover: If there is one thing I am certain of, Pete, it is that there is no question of your loyalty to John. I hope that won't bias your outlook. As for John's resignation, perhaps the best I can say is that on the basis of all facts available, the board decided this was the only logical course of action. And if . . .

Loomis (interrupting): Let me set the record straight on two points. My loyalty to John was based on respect for his abilities—not on personal grounds. And I'm not disagreeing with you, either on the basis of the facts available at the time or on those turned up by the investigation, that the action was not warranted. But I also feel that there was too hasty a collection of facts and an overreaction resulting in his dismissal. What I'm saying is that had a more thorough and penetrating investigation been made, the conclusions would probably have been different.

Clover (attempting to lead the interview back): I understand your point, Pete, but what are some of the additional facts that you think could have influenced the decision differently?

Loomis: You are most likely aware that the failure to receive the Apollo and LEM contracts had significant effects on the overall picture. But when John informally notified headquarters that our chances of receiving these two jobs were less than 50–50, he was told he was just being pessimistic. It was quite evident to him that the board of directors felt these were two prestige jobs that we simply had to get. The trouble was that while we dissipated our efforts on trying to land these low-probability programs, a half-dozen other less known, but perhaps more lucrative, opportunities slipped by.

Clover: You say John told headquarters about this. Have you any idea why the so-so probabilities and the alternatives were not openly presented and discussed at the appropriate company board meeting?

Loomis: To be frank, the 50-50 chance was an after-the-fact estimate. When the decision was made to pursue the two jobs, because of the pressure from headquarters and knowing what the work could mean to Quasar, I was undoubtedly too optimistic myself. A staff meeting was held in which the two marketing efforts were reviewed in detail.

Clover: Who attended that meeting?

Loomis: As I recall, there was George Kessler, Bill Heller, Hugh Kay, John, and myself.

Clover: Was it unanimously agreed that you should go after the two contracts?

Loomis (shaking his head): Oh, no! Bill felt very strongly that we should. He thought that the engineering department could gain a heck of a lot by being involved—state-of-the-art stuff. George was against the effort. He argued that production would be severely affected, because these projects would require such a long-term engineering effort before production could start. He wanted more immediate work that would occupy his work force. Hugh was with George. Not only was he worried about overhead and profits, but he had a "gut feeling" that our chances were less than what I forecast. He was right, of course. John was in favor of pursuing the contracts only if we had about a 75% chance of capturing each. John tossed the ball to me when he asked what our chances of getting the jobs were. At the time, I indicated that while I couldn't stick my neck out to 75%, I was willing to guess it would be much closer to 75% than to, say, 50% or even 60%. Considering the attitude at headquarters, the stakes, and my projection, we finally decided to go after both.

Clover: Are you saying that you didn't really feel that your chances were as close to 75% as you indicated?

Loomis: I believe they weren't. But that isn't to say that I didn't feel they could or should have been.

Clover: How long had you been with the company when this meeting took place, Pete?

Loomis: Just about nine months. I'm quite sure I know the reason for your question. Actually, I was not as familiar with the company as I should have been to express so strong an opinion on such an important matter.

Clover: Obviously, you showed a good deal of enthusiasm . . .

Loomis (interrupting again): And, I'm afraid you'll have to agree, naïveté. Remember, however, that this is—or at least was—a gung-ho operation. I was anxious to earn my spurs. Those contracts would have put us on the map and made Quasar and Universal household words.

Clover: I can certainly understand your decision to go after the big fish, but, once you found that you were out of fishing water, why was headquarters not kept informed of the deteriorating market picture? Wouldn't that have been the logical thing to do?

Loomis: Logical, yes, but hardly practical. In retrospect, that is probably what we should have done, but let's go back six months. That's when our fears of a drop in production began to inject themselves. Hugh's warnings about profitability were proving to be only too accurate, and there was nothing that could be pulled in at the last minute to bridge the gap.

Clover: Yes, but you must have known very early that your odds were way off.

Loomis (after a pause): Well, perhaps I did not emphasize that fact strongly enough. I assure you, however, that both George and Hugh did, since their operations were directly and indirectly involved.

Clover (bothered by Loomis' evasiveness): How, then, was the decision reached not to inform headquarters of this situation? Didn't it bother you to think that there might be adverse effects on employment?

Loomis: Once the decision was made to go after the two projects, any reversal could only result in a loss of face and prestige. Like the gambler at the roulette wheel, we plunged deeper—with about the same odds—and lost. I must confess that I had my moments of doubt about our course of action. It was quite clear that people could get hurt, but that too is all part of the game. Frankly, at no time did it occur to me that I had a greater responsibility than the one I had to John. Perhaps this is wrong, but I have always felt that I owe more loyalty to my supervisor than to the company. And besides, I'm not certain to what degree personal morality should enter into business decisions.

Clover: Pete, let me ask you one final question. What do you think we might do to prevent this sort of thing from happening again in the future?

Loomis: Frankly, I feel that headquarters should give us more independence. For example, if headquarters had not exerted pressure on us to pursue these two contracts, we might have followed a different course. To me, what happened was that headquarters decided on a set course of action, passed the word down, and then—when it became impossible for us to follow through—they looked for scape-

goats. Both John and Hugh were sacrificed because of poor headquarters policy.

Clover (rising): Thanks for a frank and open presentation of your thoughts on the situation, Pete. By the way, Jim Bowden may or may not wish to speak with you, depending on how things go in general. In any event, we'll let you know later. Once again, thanks for your ideas.

Loomis: Thanks for asking. I honestly thought this might just be allowed to die on the vine without anyone looking deeper into it.

Follow-up questions

Hubert Clover brooded over his interview with Loomis, scanning his notes in a manner that suggested more sorrow and disappointment than thought. He then decided to summarize his observations and to recommend that Bowden not interview Loomis. But, after reviewing the results of Clover's conversation, Bowden concluded that there was one more thing he wanted resolved: Why had not Loomis, in routine fashion, been put in a position to send a report back to headquarters that would have been at variance with the official statement? Later that afternoon, the two men got together. After exchanging the usual pleasantries and engaging in small talk related to the previous interview, Bowden asked the specific question he had in mind.

Bowden: The one thing that puzzles me, Pete, is why you were not able to transmit your misgivings about the possibility of receiving the two contracts directly to the corporate vice president of marketing.

Loomis: Your question, Jim, implies that I was *unable* to do this. Actually, it was always possible, but I was not *required* to do it. However, I was expected to give my observations to John and to support him in any decision he made as to how the information was to be handled.

Bowden: Your answer implies to me that you were fully aware that two distorted monthly reports were sent to corporate headquarters. Am I correct in this assumption?

Loomis: From what I have said to both you and Jim, there is no doubt that your conclusion is correct. And, to be honest, I was completely aware of the distortions in the reports. I can only repeat what I said earlier this afternoon to Hubert: my loyalty is to my supervisor, and I always support him in his use of information in any way he sees fit.

Kessler's Interrogation

The next man to be interviewed was George Kessler, vice president-manufacturing, who was an old-timer by Quasar standards, having been at Quasar for 15 years. He was known for his outspokenness, integrity, and forcefulness. Clover and Bowden decided that Bowden should conduct the interview with Kessler because there existed a somewhat close relationship between them. As a former operations man, Bowden had taken a direct interest in manufacturing, and he had developed a healthy respect for Kessler. Bowden greeted Kessler, and the two exchanged a few pleasantries.

Bowden: I guess we could keep up the chitchat all day, George, but I'm afraid we've got to get down to business. A fellow in your position must have seen what was coming—how in hell could you let it happen?

Kessler: I would rather continue reminiscing about old times than get into this. To answer your question, Jim, I saw what was coming; but, to turn the question back to you, how could I possibly have prevented it?

Bowden: All right, George, you couldn't have stopped it. Really, what I am asking is this: Seeing what was happening, wasn't there something you could have done to raise the storm signals?

Kessler: You know me well enough to realize that I am not one of the gung-ho types. While I had tremendous respect for John's ability to analyze a situation, I always suspected that he had a streak of the gambler in him. Let's face it; if he had pulled those two jobs out of the hat, he would have been Universal's brightest star.

Bowden: Getting back to the point, George, wasn't there some way for you to signal headquarters of what was happening?

Kessler (frowning): You insist on pursuing this point, don't you? Jim, you know as well as I do that I answered directly to John. I'm not going to beat a dead horse; but, without going into details, I think I expressed my views strongly on the approach we were taking. Certainly, I was concerned about a number of things . . . the number of old-time employees who were going to take a beating if this thing fizzled, as it did; what might actually happen to the company overall; and what I owed to myself as well as to John. Taking all these points into consideration, I did what I thought was morally and managerially right, and I don't say that lightly. In

expressing my doubts so forcefully, perhaps I did a disservice to everyone I tried to help.

Bowden: In what way do you think you performed a disservice?

Kessler: In short order, I found myself outside of the actual development of the monthly reports. The result was that any influence I might have exerted in determining what information was to be generated for headquarters was cancelled out.

Bowden (nodding): I appreciate your dilemma, George, and I also respect the position you took. But don't you feel that there might have been some way to get this back to our office?

Kessler: In weighing my responsibility to the company, corporate headquarters, employees, self, and supervisor, I may possibly have erred in following too narrow a path. It seemed to me at the time, and I feel the same way even now, that with the organizational structure we have, my only approach was to try to change things through the existing framework. My efforts failed. Perhaps I should have been more adventurous and requested—demanded, if you will—an audience with you fellows. But I am certain that if a similar situation arose again, I still would not do this.

Bowden: Then let me ask you what you think can be done to prevent this from happening in the future.

Kessler: To me, there must be an approach that will allow for greater communication between headquarters and the company office. Perhaps the answer lies in having an executive committee sign the monthly report; or possibly having each committee member prepare a short concurrence or dissent report of his own, after the pattern of the Supreme Court; or even a more direct approach of having each manager give an independent report to his respective staff contact at corporate headquarters. The fact is, so long as we have a characteristic line and staff organizational structure, we can only follow the channels of communication that the chief executive officer decides on. No self-respecting manager would consider surreptitiously reporting behind his superior's back.

Bowden (rising and extending a handshake): George, thanks for your observations. I like your suggestion of a concurrence or disagreement by an executive committee. I hope the next time we have a little get-together it can be under more pleasant circumstances.

Heller's Interview

To some extent, the interview had merely reinforced Bowden's estimation of Kessler. However, he couldn't help but feel a sense of frustration that a man of Kessler's caliber did not find a way to communicate his misgivings to those who could have done something about the developing Quasar problem.

After reading Bowden's notes, Clover concluded there was no need for him to talk with Kessler. Instead, he decided to carry on with the next interview. The final man singled out was William Heller, vice president-engineering, an intense, serious-minded, pipe-smoking engineer whose forte was considered to be R&D, not administrative work. He too was a long-term employee, having been with Quasar over ten years. Clover met him at the door of the conference room and, with a wave of his hand, motioned Heller to a chair.

Clover: I suppose the idea of sitting down to discuss this problem is not the most appealing thing to you, Bill. I hope it won't be as painful as realizing that an R&D project is going sour.

Heller: Since your call a few minutes ago was not completely unexpected, I prepared for this by fixing myself an extra tightly packed pipe of tobacco. It will give me more time to think about your questions.

Clover: What can you contribute to our understanding of the things that happened here, and do you have any suggestions as to how they might be prevented in the future?

Heller: I wonder if you could narrow your question somewhat. Exactly what would you like me to address myself to?

Clover: The specific problem, Bill, is this. Do you have an idea why Quasar's deteriorating condition was not reported back to headquarters? Of greatest interest, of course, is the overall condition of the plant operation, but the decline in engineering activity is something you can probably elaborate on in detail. Any light you can shed will be useful.

Heller: While you have become more specific, I still have a wide-open field. Probably I should first outline what happened to engineering, and from this we might then be able to work into the bigger picture. How does that appeal to you?

Clover (nodding): That would be a good start.

Heller: About a year ago, it became obvious that our engineering activity, including both research and development and general engineering, was going to decline. The decision was made that a joint effort with marketing would be undertaken. After a series of meetings, it was decided to pursue actively and aggressively two relatively large contracts.

Clover: Those would be the Apollo and LEM contracts. (*Heller nods assent.*) When you say it was decided that those two contracts would be pursued, what did this imply?

Heller: It meant that a radically new—for us—course of action was decided on. Always in the past we had operated as a subcontractor to primes on large systems. However, John and Pete took the stand that we were in a position to enter the systems area itself. Frankly, while I had initial skepticism about this approach, John portrayed the picture in optimistic terms. He was convinced that the contracts would be awarded more on the basis of marketing activity than on the engineering proposal, and he was equally confident that Pete's personal contacts would help us in capturing this work. Apparently John knew, or he felt he knew, that Pete had influence with the right people where those two contracts were involved. Thus, while in the past we had been merely keeping our fingers in the pie and hoping to get a piece of the action, it was decided at that point we would go the whole hog after them.

Clover: And you agreed with this approach?

Heller: As I indicated, initially I was skeptical. Our organization is simply not capable of coping with proposals of this size. However, after John and Pete argued their case so persuasively, I was fully in favor of the decision. Actually, I knew it involved a lot of risk, but Quasar stood to benefit greatly if it worked out, and so I went along with them on it.

Clover: What did you think the chances were of getting those contracts, Bill?

Heller (pausing to light his pipe): To me, our chances were less than those expressed by Pete, who, as I recall, said he figured them to be closer to 75% than to 60% or so. Frankly, I would have guessed 60% to be the upper limit on our chances for each contract. However, even at that, it seemed like a good risk because, if we had captured but one of them, engineering would have benefited greatly.

Clover: And how about the rest of the plant operations?

Heller: Here, unfortunately, I was shortsighted. While the engineering activity would benefit, in retrospect the company as a whole could conceivably lose if only one, or perhaps even if both contracts were awarded to Quasar. I might add that this point was brought out strongly by George and Hugh. To offset this argument, however, it was pointed out that while a temporary downturn might occur, in about two years Quasar would be hard pressed to satisfy the requirements for the projects. In addition, Quasar would become so well known that interim work would be easy to come by.

Clover: Might it not also have worked to Quasar's disadvantage? How can you assume that other companies would be willing to give you work, knowing that it would be short-term and that you certainly would give attention to your own contracts once it was time to begin production?

Heller: Yes, it was an optimistic outlook and probably very shortsighted from a total company point of view.

Clover: Even assuming that the decision was a good one when made, why didn't someone recognize it was the wrong course before the entire operation went sour?

Heller (puffing on his pipe for a moment): Now you are in an area that is too deep for me. Once it was decided on to pursue those contracts, my group concentrated its efforts on the technical proposal. We are extremely thin in this area. Therefore, our R&D activity was almost totally devoted to the proposal. Let me add that for approximately a 3-month period, 10- to 12-hour days and 7-day weeks were common for my staff.

Clover: But this very activity reduced your effectiveness on current work, did it not, and resulted in costly overruns and delays on contracts already in the house?

Heller: Unfortunately, yes, but that was not totally unexpected. We attempted to minimize the overruns and delays, but some were certainly inevitable. Since we were trying to maintain our staff, a lot of the added cost went into overhead and project charges as we stockpiled personnel during the initial period when the decline began to manifest itself. Of course, we had to face facts later and let some people go when it became apparent that the plans were not working out.

Clover: At that point, why didn't the company reverse itself, abandon its course, and go after some

short-term subcontract work? And why didn't you get back to headquarters with your problem?

Heller: At that point, both John and Pete felt retreat would be impossible. Frankly, I supported them against my better judgment, both because I could see no way to change their attitude, and because I had an obligation to do my utmost in attempting to rectify the situation. Now, then, your other question as to why headquarters was not informed is difficult for me to answer. What can I say?

Clover: I would like a frank comment on this point, Bill.

Heller (knocking the ashes from his pipe): Both John and Pete stood high in my book. I don't pretend to be a business manager; rather, I am an engineering manager. The tangibles of engineering are something I grasp and manipulate readily, but the intangibles of business are quite another thing. In retrospect, it's easy to criticize past decisions, but I respect the decisions that were made then. I personally felt there was an obligation to the parent company, but even though I disagreed with the principle of not reporting the situation to headquarters, I accepted it as a business decision.

Clover: Then you were aware, were you not, that the reports sent to headquarters distorted conditions at Quasar to such an extent that the status of projects was inaccurately reported, actual and projected earnings were blatantly inflated, and the entire status of the operation was totally misrepresented? How could you have accepted such a situation?

Heller: If only I could answer you in a manner that might express my feelings at the time. Was I aware of what was going on? Yes, of course, I was. But I didn't *want* to know about it. I will go so far now as to say that I tried *not to know* what was being done. Realistically, once I accepted the basic decision to ride the thing out, I felt stuck with the consequences. There was nothing, as I saw it, that I could do to alter the course taken.

Clover: Bill, did you have any opportunity to bring this to the attention of headquarters?

Heller: Formally, no, of course not. No mechanism existed, or perhaps should ever exist, for circumventing top management. On a few occasions I might have had the opportunity to mention to the corporate vice president of engineering what was happening, but I certainly would not do that.

Clover (shaking his head slowly): I think you will agree such a situation should never be allowed to exist. Can you offer any suggestions as to how information of such importance to the welfare of both the company and the corporation could be made available to top management without violating any precepts—actual or imaginary?

Heller: I have given considerable thought to this point. I honestly feel that what gets reported back to headquarters can only reflect what the president sees fit. I would hit the ceiling if I found out one of my project managers was reporting directly or indirectly to the president. By the same token, the president shouldn't have to guard against insurgency in his ranks. The corporation might use an internal audit team composed of knowledgeable personnel to make frequent checks on various phases of the operation. Apart from that, I've no suggestion.

Clover: Bill, your pipe's been cold and empty long enough. Thanks for your comments. Hopefully, we won't need another one of these sessions with you.

Morgan's Opinions

Clover discussed his report with Bowden, and they agreed that another interview with Heller was unnecessary. Then they went over the results of all three interviews in depth. When they had finished, they decided to pursue two additional questions from two other specific areas: (a) Why did the accounting people not find a way to report to headquarters? (b) What was the quality of the morale of the personnel during this period?

Accordingly, Donald Morgan, chief accountant, and Paul Brown, vice president-industrial relations, were invited to sit down with Bowden and Clover, respectively, in two simultaneous sessions. Since both corporate fact finders felt that too much briefing might tend to "lead" the interviews and stifle response, they agreed that the only statement they would make at the start would be to the effect that efforts were being made to prevent a repetition of the Quasar situation in the future.

Bowden: Don, you certainly are aware of the upheaval here at Quasar, and I suspect you know pretty well the reasons for it.

Morgan: Yes, I have a good idea of what's what.

Bowden: I wonder if you would care to express your opinions on two specific points. First, why was it

not possible to have the information fed back to corporate headquarters once the deteriorating situation began and, second, what might be done to prevent what happened from taking place again?

Morgan: As standard company policy on reports, we generate our financial statements from whatever information is given to us. Our statements, in turn, are sent to the controller's office, and he does what he sees fit with them. Should we receive instructions from his office to reorganize, let's say, or otherwise manipulate the reports, there is very little we can do but follow instructions. This is particularly true when matters of judgment are involved. Let me give you a for-instance: if a project is reported as being behind schedule by the program manager and, after review by the controller's office it is decided that it is not all that far behind, naturally adjustments are made. Or, say, an expected contract has not yet been received, but management decides to open up a project number anyway and begins accepting charges in anticipation of receiving the job; this too is done. So far as I can see, this is nothing more than exercising management prerogative. I will summarize my position by saying that I do pretty much what I am told. Sometimes I may not like it, but my job is not to set policy or to question decisions. Rather, it is to follow instructions.

Brown's Observations

At that point, Bowden decided that he had heard enough and abruptly ended the interview. Meanwhile, Clover was undertaking his interview with Paul Brown.

Clover: Paul, can you give any insight into the state of morale during the period when Quasar was apparently falsifying reports to the home office and after it became apparent that a serious problem existed?

Brown: For a while, everybody acted as if they were on "pot"; everyone was filled with high expectations. To be sure, there were a couple of exceptions. But, in rapid fashion, things began to settle down and disillusionment set in. Many people sensed that there was trouble ahead and that nothing was being done. After a month or two, the exodus began, and, as you know, it still hasn't ceased. I know that some of the managers tried their best to hang onto their key people, but as usual it was just this caliber of individual who could read the

writing on the wall and got out while the getting was good. I'm equally certain that a number of the other top people would have left except for loyalty to the company and their fellow employees, their years of company service, and/or other factors. My only other observation on this is that I hope our new president and controller have been selected

more for solid, long-range accomplishments than for flashy, short-term results.

The interviews having been concluded, Clover and Bowden are now faced with drafting a series of recommendations on the individuals interviewed and the steps to be taken by Universal Corporation.